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CYBER SECURITY ACTIVE DEFENSE: 
PLAYING WITH FIRE OR SOUND RISK MANAGEMENT? 
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Trying to change its program 
Trying to change the mode . . . crack the code 
Images conflicting into data overload
1
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] “Banks Remain the Top Target for Hackers, Report Says,” is the 
title of an April 2013 American Banker article.
2
  Yet, no new 
                                                     
* The author is a cyber-security policy analyst in the banking industry and a digital 
forensics examiner in private practice.  Mr. Harrington is a graduate with honors from 
Taft Law School, and holds the CCFP, MCSE, CISSP, CHFI, and CSOXP certifications.  
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Investigation Association, is a current member of Infragard, the Financial Services 
Roundtable’s legislative and regulatory working groups, FS-ISAC, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce “Cyber Working Group,” the Fourth District Ethics Committee in Minnesota, 
and is a council member of the Minnesota State Bar Association’s Computer & 
Technology Law Section.  Mr. Harrington teaches computer forensics for Century 
College in Minnesota, and recently contributed a chapter on the Code of Ethics for the 
forthcoming Official (ISC)²® Guide to the Cyber Forensics Certified Professional 
CBK®.  He is also an instructor for the CCFP certification. 
 
1
 RUSH, The Body Electric, on GRACE UNDER PRESSURE (Mercury Records 1984). 
 
2
 Sean Sposito, Banks Remain the Top Target for Hackers, Report Says, AM. BANKER 
(April 23, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_78/banks-
remain-the-top-target-for-hackers-report-says-1058543-1.html. 
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comprehensive U.S. cyber legislation has been enacted since 2002,
3
 and 
neither legislative history nor the statutory language of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) or Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) make reference to the Internet.
4
  Courts have nevertheless filled in 
the gaps—sometimes with surprising results.  
 
[2] Because state law, federal legislative proposals, and case law all 
are in a continuing state of flux, practitioners have found it necessary to 
follow these developments carefully, forecast, and adapt to them, all of 
which has proved quite challenging.  As the title of this Comment 
suggests, deploying sound cyber security practices is not only equally as 
                                                     
3
 ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO 
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 3 (2013), 
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf (discussing, for example, the 
Federal Information Security Management Act).  
 
4
 See Yonatan Lupu, The Wiretap Act and Web Monitoring: A Breakthrough for Privacy 
Rights?, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶¶ 7, 9 (2004) (discussing the use of the ECPA and the 
lack of words such as “Internet,” “World Wide Web,” and “e-commerce” in the text or 
legislative history); see also Eric C. Bosset et al., Private Actions Challenging Online 
Data Collection Practices Are Increasing: Assessing the Legal Landscape, INTELL. PROP. 
& TECH. L.J., Feb. 2011, at 3 (“[F]ederal statutes such as the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) . . . were drafted 
long before today’s online environment could be envisioned . . . .”); Miguel Helft & 
Claire Cain Miller, 1986 Privacy Law Is Outrun by the Web, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2011),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/technology/10privacy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1
& (noting that Congress enacted the ECPA before the World Wide Web or widespread 
use of e-mail);  Orin S. Kerr, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A User's Guide to 
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208, 1213-14, 1229-30 (2004); see generally The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on Privacy in the Digital Age: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1-2 (2011) (statement of 
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at 
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/ecpa.pdf (“[D]etermining how best to bring this 
privacy law into the Digital Age will be one of Congress's greatest challenges. . . . [The] 
ECPA is a law that is hampered by conflicting standards that cause confusion for law 
enforcement, the business community, and American consumers alike.”). 
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challenging, but also “risky,” which may seem counterintuitive in light of 
the fact that intent of cyber security programs is to manage risk, not create 
it.
5
  
 
[3] Cyber security risks concern exploits made possible by 
technological advances, some of which are styled with familiar catch-
phrases: “e-Discovery,” “social media,” “cloud computing,” 
“Crowdsourcing,” and “big data,” to name a few.  Yet, long before the 
term “cloud computing” became part of contemporary parlance, Picasa 
used to store photos in the cloud (where the “cloud” is a metaphor for the 
Internet).
6
  This author has been using Hotmail since 1997 (another form 
of cloud computing).  As the foregoing examples illustrate, the neologisms 
were long predated by their underlying concepts. 
 
[4] One of the latest techno-phrases du jour is “hack back.”7  The 
concept isn’t new, and the term has been “common” parlance at least as 
far back as 2003.
8
  “Hack back”—sometimes termed “active defense,” 
“back hacking,” “retaliatory hacking,” or “offensive countermeasures” 
(“OCM”)—has been defined as the  
                                                     
5
 See generally NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 4 (Version 1.0, 2014) available at 
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf 
(describing The Framework as “a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity risk”). 
 
6
 See, Eric Griffith, What is Cloud Computing?, PC MAGAZINE (May 13, 2013) 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp. 
 
7
 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, A New Brand of Cyber Security: Hacking the Hackers, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/04/business/la-fi-cyber-
defense-20121204/2 (proposing that “companies should be able to ‘hack back’ by, for 
example, disabling servers that host cyber attacks”). 
 
8
 See, e.g., Scott Carle, Crossing the Line: Ethics for the Security Professional, SANS 
INST. (2003), http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/hackers/crossing-line-
ethics-security-professional-890.  Readers, doubtless, will know of earlier references.   
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“process of identifying attacks on a system and, if possible, 
identifying the origin of the attacks.”  Back hacking can be 
thought of as a kind of reverse engineering of hacking 
efforts, where security consultants and other professionals 
try to anticipate attacks and work on adequate responses.”9   
 
A more accurate and concise definition might be “turning the tables on a 
cyberhacking assailant: thwarting or stopping the crime, or perhaps even 
trying to steal back what was taken.”10 One private security firm, 
renowned for its relevant specialization, defines active defense, in 
pertinent part, as “deception, containment, tying up adversary resources, 
and creating doubt and confusion while denying them the benefits of their 
operations.”11  Some have proposed—or carried out—additional measures, 
such as “photographing the hacker using his own system’s camera, 
implanting malware in the hacker’s network, or even physically disabling 
or destroying the hacker’s own computer or network.”12  
                                                     
9
 TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/23172/back-hack (last visited June 
28, 2014); see also NETLINGO, http://www.netlingo.com/word/back-hack.php (last 
visited June 28, 2014) (“[Back-hack is t]he reverse process of finding out who is hacking 
into a system.  Attacks can usually be traced back to a computer or pieced together from 
‘electronic bread crumbs’ unknowingly left behind by a cracker.”). 
 
10
 Melissa Riofrio, Hacking Back: Digital Revenge Is Sweet but Risky, PCWORLD (May 
9, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2038226/hacking-back-digital-
revenge-is-sweet-but-risky.html. 
 
11
 Dmitri Alperovitch, Active Defense: Time for a New Security Strategy, CROWDSTRIKE 
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/active-defense-time-new-security-
strategy/. 
 
12
 COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 81 
(2013) [hereinafter THE IP COMMISSION REPORT], available at 
http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_052213.pdf; see also Sam Cook, 
Georgia Outs Russian Hacker, Takes Photo with His Own Webcam, GEEK (Oct. 31, 
2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.geek.com/news/georgia-outs-russian-hacker-takes-photo-
with-his-own-webcam-1525485/.  See  Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Thinking 
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[5] Back hacking has been a top-trending technology topic over the 
past year, prompted in part by the controversial Report of the Commission 
on the Theft of American Intellectual Property (“IP Commission 
Report”),13 and has been debated on blogs, symposium panels, editorials, 
and news media forums by information security professionals and lawyers 
alike.  One with the potential to grab practitioners’ attention was a panel of 
attorneys David Navetta and Ron Raether—both well regarded in the 
information security community—discussing the utility and propriety of 
such practices.  One opined that, if the circumstance is exigent enough, a 
company may take “measures into [its] own hands,” and that it would, 
“not likely be prosecuted under the CFAA, depending on the exigency of 
the circumstances.”14  The other reasoned that hack back “technically 
violates the law, but is anyone going to prosecute you for that?  
Unlikely.”15  He noted, “[i]t provides a treasure trove of forensic 
information that you can use,” and continued, “[w]ith respect to the more 
extreme end of hack back, where you are actually going to shut down 
servers, I think there is a necessity element to it—an exigency: if 
someone’s life is threatened, if it appears that there is going to be a 
monumental effect on the company, then it might be justified.”16  In 2014 
                                                                                                                                    
Through Active Defense in Cyberspace, in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring 
Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy 
327, 328 (The National Academies Press ed., 2010) (“Counterstrikes of this nature have 
already been occurring on the Internet over the last decade, by both government and 
private actors, and full software packages designed to enable counterstriking have also 
been made commercially available, even though such counterstrikes are of questionable 
legality”). 
 
13
 See THE IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12.  
 
14
 Tom Fields, To ‘Hack Back’ or Not?, BANKINFOSECURITY (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/to-hack-back-or-not-a-5545. 
 
15
 Id. 
 
16
 Id. 
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at the most recent RSA conference, where the “hackback” debate 
continued, the presentation was billed, in part, with the proposition, 
“[a]ctive defense should be viewed as a diverse set of techniques along a 
spectrum of varying risk and legality.”17  And, other commentators have 
urged that “offensive operations must be considered as a possible device 
in the cyber toolkit.” 18  
 
[6] Most commentators and scholars, however, seem to agree that 
“hack back” is not only “risky,” but is also not a viable option for a variety 
of reasons.
19
  Hack backs and other surreptitious cyber acts incur the risks 
of criminal liability, civil liability, regulatory liability, professional 
discipline, compromise of corporate ethics, injury to brand image, and 
escalation.  One practitioner quoted by the LA Times exclaimed, “[i]t's not 
only legally wrong, it's morally wrong.”20  James Andrew Lewis, a senior 
                                                     
17
 Hackback? Claptrap!—An Active Defense Continuum for the Private Sector, RSA 
CONF. (Feb. 27, 2014, 9:20 AM), 
http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us14/agenda/sessions/1146/hackback-claptrap-an-
active-defense-continuum-for. 
 
18
 Shane McGee, Randy V. Sabett, & Anand Shah, Adequate Attribution: A Framework 
for Developing a National Policy for Private Sector Use of Active Defense, 8 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 1 (2013) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol8/iss1/3 
 
19
 See, e.g., Rafal Los, Another Reason Hacking Back Is Probably a Bad Idea, 
INFOSECISLAND (June 20, 2013), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/23228-
Another-Reason-Hacking-Back-is-Probably-a-Bad-Idea.html; Riofrio, supra note 10. 
 
20
 Dilanian, supra note 7; see also William Jackson, The Hack-Back vs. The Rule of Law: 
Who Wins?, CYBEREYE, (May 31, 2013, 9:39 AM)  
http://gcn.com/blogs/cybereye/2013/00/hacking-back-vs-the-rule-of-law.aspx (stating 
“[i]n the face of increasing cyber threats there is an understandable pent-up desire for an 
active response, but this response should not cross legal thresholds.  In the end, we either 
have the rule of law or we don’t.  That others do not respect this rule does not excuse us 
from observing it.  Admittedly this puts public- and private-sector organizations and 
individuals at a short-term disadvantage while correcting the situation, but it’s a pill we 
will have to swallow.”).  
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fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, characterized 
hacking back as “a remarkably bad idea that would harm the national 
interest.”21  The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, a major 
cybersecurity bill passed by the House in April 2013, contained an 
amendment that specifically provided that the bill did not permit hacking 
back.
22
  Representative Jim Langevin (RI-D), who authored the 
amendment, explained, “[w]ithout this clear restriction, there is simply too 
much risk of potentially dangerous misattribution or misunderstanding of 
any hack-back actions.”23  Further, the private security firm renowned for 
its active defense strategies, mentioned ante, has attempted to distance 
itself from the phrases such as “hack back” and “retaliatory hacking,” 
preferring instead the broader phrase “active defense.”24 Another example 
of the importance of subtleties in word choice may be “Countermeasure,” 
where some appear to have conflated the word with the concept of active 
defense.
25
   
                                                     
21
 James Andrew Lewis, Private Retaliation in Cyberspace, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & 
INT’L STUDIES (May 22, 2013), http://csis.org/publication/private-retaliation-cyberspace. 
 
22
 See Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. (2013).   
 
23
 Christopher M. Matthews, Support Grows to Let Cybertheft Victims 'Hack Back', 
WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2013, 9:33 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578517374103394466
. 
 
24
 See Alperovitch, supra note 11.  The firm’s online marketing literature includes the 
following: “Active Defense is NOT about ‘hack-back,’ retaliation, or vigilantism . . . we 
are fundamentally against these tactics and believe they can be counterproductive, as well 
as potentially illegal.”  Id.; see also Paul Roberts, Don’t Call It a Hack Back: 
Crowdstrike Unveils Falcon Platform, SECURITY LEDGER (June 19, 2013, 11:47 AM), 
https://securityledger.com/2013/06/dont-call-it-a-hack-back-crowdstrike-unveils-falcon-
platform/.  
 
25
 Charlie Mitchell, Senate Judiciary Panel Will Examine Stronger Penalties for Cyber 
Crimes and Espionage, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (May 9, 2014) 
http://insidecybersecurity.com/Cyber-Daily-News/Daily-News/senate-judiciary-panel-
will-examine-stronger-penalties-for-cyber-crimes-and-espionage/menu-id-1075.html 
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II.  ACTIVE DEFENSE APPROACHES 
 
[7] Self-defense is not an abstraction created by civilization, but a law 
spawned by nature itself, and has been justified since antiquity.
26
  It has 
been regarded since the early modern period as available to redress 
injuries against a state’s sovereign rights.27  There is little question cyber-
attacks against a designated critical infrastructure are attacks against a 
state’s sovereign rights,28 because much of civilian infrastructure is both a 
military and national asset.
29
  Accordingly, the focus of 2014 NATO 
                                                                                                                                    
(stating “[a]uthorization for so-called countermeasures is included in the draft cyber 
information-sharing and liability protection bill . . . White House and Department of 
Homeland Security officials . . . declined to discuss the administration's view of 
deterrence issues such as active defense.”).  To be distinguished from OCM, 
“countermeasure” is defined in the draft Cybersecurity Information-Sharing Act of 2014 
as “an action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure applied to an information 
system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system 
that prevents or mitigates a known or suspected cybersecurity threat or security 
vulnerability.”  See H.R. 624.  
 
26
 See, e.g., Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Speech of M.T. Cicero in Defence of Titus 
Annius Milo, in THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 390, 392-393 (C.D. Yonge 
trans., 1913).  
 
27
 Sheng Li, Note, When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?, 
38 YALE J. INT'L L. 179, 182 (2013). 
 
28
 See, e.g., WALTER GARY SHARP SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 129-31 
(1999). 
 
29
 See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO TITLE V OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT SUPPLEMENTAL 
AUTHORIZATION AND PERSONNEL BENEFITS ACT OF 1991 (PUBLIC LAW 102-25) N-1 
(1992) (“Civilian employees, despite seemingly insurmountable logistical problems, 
unrelenting pressure, and severe time constraints, successfully accomplished what this 
nation asked of them in a manner consistent with the highest standards of excellence and 
professionalism.”). 
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International Conference on Cyber Conflict (“CyCon”) is active cyber 
defense, including implications for critical infrastructure.
30
  Likewise, a 
project sponsored by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of 
Excellence is set to publish a report in 2016 that establishes acceptable 
responses to pedestrian or quotidian cyber-attacks against nations, whereas 
its predecessor, regarded as an academic text, focused on cyber-attacks 
against a country that are physically disruptive or injurious to people and 
possible responses under the UN charter and military rules.
31
  Both works 
are based on the concepts of self-defense and, under certain circumstances, 
preemptive “anticipatory self-defense.”32  
 
[8] The questions that scholars, policymakers, information security 
experts, and corporate executives have struggled with, however, is at what 
threshold do such attacks warrant the protection of the state,
33
 whether a 
private corporation may respond in lieu of or in concert with protection by 
the state, and to what extent such collusion constitutes excessive 
entanglement between the private and public sector.  Implicit in these 
questions is whether the government is willing and able to develop a 
                                                     
30
 See CYCON, http://ccdcoe.org/cycon/index.html (last visited July 16, 2014).  
 
31
 See NATO COOP. CYBER DEFENCE CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 4 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 
2013); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 & art. 51 (governing the modern law of self-
defense). 
 
32
 See, e.g., Keiko Kono, Briefing Memo: Cyber Security and the Tallinn Manual, NAT’L 
INST. FOR DEF. STUDIES NEWS, Oct. 2013, at 2, available at 
www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/pdf/2013/briefing_e180.pdf.   
 
33
 See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman & Danny Yadron, Banks Seek U.S. Help on Iran 
Cyberattacks, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324734904578244302923178548
; Christopher J. Castelli, DOJ Official Urges Public-Private Cybersecurity Partnership 
Amid Legal Questions, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (April 1, 2014), 
http://insidecybersecurity.com/Cyber-Daily-News/Daily-News/doj-official-urges-public-
private-cybersecurity-partnership-amid-legal-questions/menu-id-1075.html.  
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modern and adaptable regulatory and criminal law framework and to 
allocate adequate law enforcement resources to confront the problem.
34
  
Because, at the time of this writing, it is widely perceived that the 
government is not yet willing and able,
35
 victims often do not report 
suspected or actual cyber-attacks, and have resorted to inappropriate self-
help, deploying their own means of investigating and punishing 
transgressors.
36
  As one commentator posits,  
 
With regard to computer crime, some might argue that the 
entire investigative process be outsourced to the business 
community.  Historically, the privatization of investigations 
has assisted public law enforcement by allowing them to 
concentrate on other responsibilities, and has prevented 
                                                     
34
 One such example is the “Computer Trespasser” exception added by Congress to the 
Wiretap Act, which allows law enforcement officials to monitor the activities of hackers 
when (1) the owner or operator of the network authorizes the interception; (2) law 
enforcement is engaged in a lawful investigation; (3) law enforcement has reasonable 
grounds to believe the contents of the communications will be relevant to that 
investigation; and (4) such interception does not acquire communications other than those 
transmitted to or from the hacker.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i)(I)-(IV) (2012); see also 
Bradley J. Schaufenbuel, The Legality of Honeypots, ISSA J., April 2008, at 16, 19, 
available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-legality-of-honeypots-50070/. 
 
35
 See, e.g., David E. Sanger, White House Details Thinking on Cybersecurity Flaws, 
New York Times, (April 28, 2014) (discussing the Government’s admission that it 
refrains from disclosing major computer sercurity vulnerabilities that could be useful to 
“thwart a terrorist attack, stop the theft of our nation’s intellectual property, or even 
discover more dangerous vulnerabilities that are being used by hackers or other 
adversaries to exploit our networks.”) 
  
36
 See Sameer Hinduja, Computer Crime Investigations in the United States: Leveraging 
Knowledge from the Past to Address the Future, 1 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 
(2007) (citation omitted). 
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their resources from being allocated in too sparse a manner 
to be useful.” 37 
  
Awaiting the ultimate resolution of these questions, American 
corporations have developed an array of active defense tactics.  Below are 
a few of the more common examples of those, and the corresponding 
challenges: 
 
A. Beaconing 
 
[9] Beaconing is one of the most cited active defense techniques, and 
one mentioned in the IP Commission Report (along with “meta-tagging,” 
and “watermarking”) as a way to enhance electronic files to “allow for 
awareness of whether protected information has left an authorized network 
and can potentially identify the location of files in the event that they are 
stolen.”38  A benign version of beaconing is the use of so-called Web 
bugs.
39
  A Web bug is a link—a surreptitious file object—commonly used 
by spammers and placed in an e-mail message or e-mail attachment, 
which, when opened, will cause the e-mail client or program will attempt 
to retrieve an image file object from a remote Web server and, in the 
                                                     
37
 Id. at 19. But see Kesan & Hayes, supra, note 12 at 33 (“there is a more significant 
downside of entrusting active defense to private firms. Our model addressing the optimal 
use of active defense emphasizes that there are threshold points where permitting 
counterstrikes would be the socially optimal solution. However, it does not define these 
thresholds, and determining these thresholds requires some sort of standardization. It 
would be unwise to allow individual companies to make these decisions on a case by case 
basis.”) 
 
38
 THE IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 81. See also Joseph Menn, Hacked 
Companies Fight Back With Controversial Steps, REUTERS, June 18, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/18/us-media-tech-summit-cyber-strikeback-
idUSBRE85G07S20120618  
 
39
 See Stephanie Olsen, Nearly Undetectable Tracking Device Raises Concerns, CNET 
(July 12, 2000), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-243077.html. 
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process, transmit information that includes the user’s IP address and other 
information.
40
  This transmission is not possible “if the user did not 
preconfigure the e-mail client or program to refrain from retrieving images 
or HTML content from the Internet,” or if the user’s e-mail client blocks 
externally-hosted images by default.
41
  “This information becomes 
available to the sender either through an automated report service (e.g., 
ReadNotify.com) or simply by monitoring traffic to the Web server.”42  In 
one project demonstrating the use advocated by the IP Commission 
Report, researchers employed such technology in decoy documents to 
track possible misuse of confidential documents.
43
  So, is beaconing legal? 
 
[10] The Wall Street Journal (the “Journal”) quoted Drexel University 
law professor Harvey Rishikof—who also is co-chairman of the American 
Bar Association’s Cybersecurity Legal Task Force—as saying the legality 
of beaconing is not entirely clear.
44
  Rishikof is quoted as saying, 
“‘[t]here's the black-letter law, and there's the gray area. . . . Can you put a 
beacon on your data? Another level is, could you put something on your 
data that would perform a more aggressive action if the data was 
                                                     
40
 See id. See also John Gilroy, Ask The Computer Guy, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at 
H07 (describing web bugs in lay parlance). 
 
41
 Sean L. Harrington, Collaborating with a Digital Forensics Expert: Ultimate Tag 
Team or Disastrous Duo?, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 353, 363 (2011), available at 
http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/7.Harrington.pdf. 
 
42
 Id. 
 
43
 See generally Brian M. Bowen et al., Baiting Inside Attackers Using Decoy Documents, 
COLUM. UNIV. DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI. (2009), available at 
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/2009/DecoyDocumentsSECCOM09.pdf 
(last visited May 13, 2014) (introducing and discussing properties of decoys as a guide to 
design “trap-based defenses” to better detect the likelihood of insider attacks). 
 
44
 See Matthews, supra note 23. 
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taken?’”45  The article went on to suggest more aggressive strategies such 
as “inserting code that would cause stolen data to self-destruct or inserting 
a program in the data that would allow a company to seize control of any 
cameras on the computers where the data were being stored.”46  The 
Journal, citing an anonymous Justice Department source, further reported 
that, “[i]n certain circumstances beaconing could be legal, as long as the 
concealed software wouldn't do other things like allow a company to 
access information on the system where the stolen data were stored.”47 
 
[11] Another important consideration is the fact that beaconing may fall 
within one of the active defense definitions (supra) as “deception.”48  
Although deception is recognized as both a common and effective 
investigative technique,
49
 the problem is the possibility that the activities 
of the investigator could be imputed under Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 5.3 to one or more attorneys responsible for directing or 
approving of those activities.
50
  Under Model Rule 8.4(c), neither an 
attorney nor an attorney’s agent under his or her direction or control may 
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
                                                     
45
 Id.   
 
46
 Id. 
 
47
 Id. 
 
48
 See Harrington, supra note 41, at 362-64. 
 
49
 The Supreme Court has tacitly approved deception as a valid law enforcement 
technique in investigations and interrogations.  See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 
(1990) (“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception . . .”); United States v. 
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973) (“Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are 
necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.”); Allan Lengel, Fed Agents Going 
Undercover on Social Networks Like Facebook, AOLNEWS (Mar. 28, 2010, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.ticklethewire.com/2010/03/28/fed-agents-going-undercover-on-social-
networks-like-facebook/.  
 
50
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2013). 
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misrepresentation.”51  Although the question of whether deception, as 
contemplated in Rule 8.4, exists in the context of incident response or 
network forensics investigations is not well settled,
52
 most states have held 
“[t]here are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the 
equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.”53  A few state bar 
associations have already addressed similar technology-related ethical 
pitfalls.  The Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance 
Committee advised in Opinion 2009–02 that an attorney who asks an 
agent (such as an investigator) to “friend” a party in Facebook in order to 
obtain access to that party’s non-public information, would violate, among 
others, Rule 5.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.
54
  
Likewise, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee 
on Professional and Judicial Ethics issued Formal Opinion 2010–2, which 
provides that a lawyer violates, among others, New York Rules of 
                                                     
51
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c); see, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action 
Against Carlson, No. A13-1091 (Minn. July 11, 2013) (public reprimand for “falsely 
posing as a former client of opposing counsel and posting a negative review about 
opposing counsel on a website, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.4(a) and 
8.4(c)”); In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002) (disciplining a prosecutor, who 
impersonated a public defender in an attempt to induce the surrender of a murder suspect, 
for an act of deception that violated the Rules of Professional Conduct). 
 
52
 See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Muddy Waters: Spyware’s Legal and Ethical 
Implications, GPSOLO MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2006, 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_
magazine_index/spywarelegalethicalimplications.html (“The legality of spyware is 
murky, at best. The courts have spoken of it only infrequently, so there is precious little 
guidance.”). 
 
53
 In re Disciplinary Action Against Zotaley, 546 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Minn. 1996) (quoting 
MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3 cmt. 3 (2005)). 
 
54
 See PHILA. BAR ASS’N PROF’L GUIDANCE COMM., Op. 2009-02, at 1-2 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerRe
sources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf. 
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Professional Conduct Rule 5.3, if an attorney employs an agent to engage 
in the deception of “friending” a party under false pretenses to obtain 
evidence from a social networking website.
55
 
 
B.  Threat Counter-Intelligence Gathering 
 
[12] One of the most seemingly-innocuous active defense activities is 
intelligence gathering. Security analyst David Bianco defines threat 
intelligence as “[c]onsuming information about adversaries, tools or 
techniques and applying this to incoming data to identify malicious 
activity.”56  Threat intelligence gathering ranges from everything from 
reverse malware analysis and attribution to monitoring inbound and 
outbound corporate e-mail to more risky endeavors.
57
  Some security 
                                                     
55
 See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N PROF’L & JUDICIAL ETHICS COMM., Formal Op. 2010-2 (2010), 
available at http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/reports/show_html.php?rid=1134; cf. 
Justin P. Murphy & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence in Government 
Investigations and Criminal Proceedings: A Frontier of New Legal Issues, 19 RICH. J.L. 
& TECH. 11, ¶ 21 n.76 (2013) (citing similar ethics opinions rendered by bar committees 
in New York State and San Diego County). 
 
56
 David Bianco, Use of the Term “Intelligence” in the RSA 2014 Expo, ENTERPRISE 
DETECTION & RESPONSE (Feb. 28, 2014) http://detect-
respond.blogspot.com/#!/2014/03/use-of-term-intelligence-at-rsa.html. 
 
57
 See Sameer, supra note 36, at 15 (citing A. Meehan, G. Manes, L. Davis, J. Hale & S. 
Shenoi, Packet Sniffing for Automated Chat Room Monitoring and Evidence 
Preservation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2001 IEEE WORKSHOP ON INFORMATION 
ASSURANCE AND SECURITY 285, 285 (2001)) (“[T]he monitoring of bulletin-boards and 
chat-rooms by investigators has led to the detection and apprehension of those who 
participate in sex crimes against children.”), available at http://index-
of.es/Sniffers/Sniffers_pdf/52463601-packet-sniffing-for-automated-chat-room-
74909.pdf; see, e.g., Kimberly J. Mitchell, Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Police 
Posing as Juveniles Online to Catch Sex Offenders: Is It Working?, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. 
RES. & TREATMENT 241 (2005); Lyta Penna, Andrew Clark & George Mohay, 
Challenges of Automating the Detection of Paedophile Activity on the Internet, in 
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital 
Forensic Engineering (2005), available at 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/20860/1/penna2005sadfe.pdf. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 4 
 
 
16 
 
experts claim to frequent “Internet store fronts” for malware, “after 
carefully cloaking [their] identity to remain anonymous.”58  The reality, 
however, is that gaining access to and remaining on these black market 
fora requires the surreptitious visitor either to: (1) participate (“pay to 
play”); (2) to have developed a reputation over months or years, or 
founded the underground forum ab initio; or (3) to have befriended or 
been extended a personal invitation by an established member.  The first 
two of these three activities implies that the participant would have co-
conspirator or accomplice liability in the underlying crimes.  Another risk 
is, if the site is reputed to also purvey child pornography, a court may find 
that the site visitor acquired possession (even as temporary Internet cache) 
of the contraband knowingly, even if the true intent of lurking was to 
gather intelligence.
59
  Another obvious risk is that surreptitious monitoring 
of hacker sites using false credentials or representations is an act of 
deception which, for the reasons more fully set forth above, could create 
disciplinary liability for any attorneys who are involved or acquiesce to 
the activity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
58
 Martin Moylan, Target’s Data Breach Link to ‘the Amazon of Stolen Credit Card 
Information’, MPRNEWS (February 3, 2014), 
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/02/02/stolen-credit-and-debit-card-numbers-are-
just-a-few-clicks-away. 
 
59
 See “Investigating the Dark Web — The Challenges of Online Anonymity for Digital 
Forensics Examiners,” FORENSIC FOCUS (July 28, 2014) (“It is certainly easier to access 
indecent images of children and similar content on the dark net.”) Available at 
http://articles.forensicfocus.com/2014/07/28/investigating-the-dark-web-the-challenges-
of-online-anonymity-for-digital-forensics-examiners/. And see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 
617.247 subd. 4(a) (2013) (criminalizing possession of “a pornographic work [involving 
minors] or a computer disk or computer or other electronic, magnetic, or optical storage 
system or a storage system of any other type, containing a pornographic work, knowing 
or with reason to know its content and character”). 
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C. Sinkholing 
 
[13] Sinkholing is the impersonation of a botnet command-and-control 
server in order to intercept and receive malicious traffic from its clients.
60
  
To accomplish this, either the domain registrar must redirect the domain 
name to the investigator’s machine (which only works when the 
connection is based on a DNS name), or the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) must redirect an existing IP address to the investigator’s machine 
(possible only if the investigator’s machine is located in the IP range of 
the same provider), or the ISP must redirect all traffic destined for an IP 
address to the investigator’s machine, instead (the “walled garden” 
approach).
61
 
 
[14] Sinkholing involves the same issues of deception discussed ante, 
but also relies on the domain registrar’s willingness and legal ability to 
assist.  As Link and Sancho point out in their paper Lessons Learned 
While Sinkholing Botnets—Not as Easy as it Looks!, “[u]nless there is a 
court order that compels them to comply with such a request, without the 
explicit consent of the owner/end-user of the domain, the registrar is 
unable to grant such requests.”62  Doubtless they were referring to the 
Wiretap Act (Title 1 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act), 
which generally prohibits unconsented interception (contemporaneous 
with transmission), disclosure, or use of electronic communications.
63
  
                                                     
60
 See Rainer Link & David Sancho, Lessons Learned While Sinkholing Botnets—Not As 
Easy As It Looks!, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE 106, 106 
(2011), available at http://www.trendmicro.com/media/misc/lessons-learned-
virusbulletin-conf-en.pdf.  
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 Id. at 107. 
 
63
 “[C]onsent may be demonstrated through evidence of appropriate notice to users 
through service terms, privacy policies or similar disclosures that inform users of the 
potential for monitoring.” Bosset et.al, supra note 4 (citing Mortensen v. Bresnan 
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Further, a federal district court recently ruled that intentionally 
circumventing an IP address blacklist in order to crawl an otherwise-
publicly available website constitutes “access without authorization” 
under the CFAA.
64
  Link and Sancho continue that registrars have little 
incentive to assist because it does not generate revenue, and note that 
sinkholing invites distributed denial of service (“DDoS”) retaliation which 
could affect other customers of a cloud-provided broadband connection.
65
  
Finally, sinkholing is likely to collect significant amounts of data, 
including personally identifiable information (“PII”).  The entity 
collecting PII is likely to be subject to the data privacy, handling, and 
disclosure laws of all the jurisdictions whence the data came. 
 
D.  Honeypots 
 
[15] A honeypot is defined as “a computer system on the Internet that is 
expressly set up to attract and ‘trap’ people who attempt to penetrate other 
people’s computer systems.”66  It may be best thought of as “an 
information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use 
of that resource.”67  Honeypots do arguably involve deception, but have 
been in use for a comparatively long time, and are generally accepted as a 
valid information security tactic (therefore, relatively free from 
controversy).  The legal risks, historically, have been identified as: (1) 
                                                                                                                                    
Commc’ns, LLC, No. CV 10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 WL 5140454, at *3-5 (D. Mont. Dec. 
13, 2010)). 
 
64
 See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182-83 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 
65
 See Link & Sancho, supra note 60, at 107-08. 
 
66
 Honeypot, SEARCHSECURITY, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/honey-pot 
(last visited June 29, 2014).  
 
67
 Eric Cole & Stephen Northcutt, Honeypots: A Security Manager's Guide to Honeypots, 
SANS INST., http://www.sans.edu/research/security-laboratory/article/honeypots-guide 
(last visited May 13, 2014). 
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potential violations of the ECPA;
68
 and (2) possibly creating an 
entrapment defense for the intruder.
69
  Neither of these is applicable here, 
because, respectively: (1) the context of the deployment discussed herein 
is the corporate entity as the honeypot owner (thus, a party to the wire 
communication); and (2) the corporate entity is not an agent of law 
enforcement, and, further, the entrapment defense is only available when 
defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime (here, a hacker 
intruding into a honeypot is predisposed).
70
  Nevertheless, Justice 
Department attorney Richard Salgado, speaking at the Black Hat 
Briefings, did reportedly warn that the law regarding honeypots is 
“untested” and that entities implementing devices or networks designed to 
attract hackers could face such legal issues as liability for an attack 
launched from a compromised honeypot.
71
  This possibility was discussed 
six years ago: 
 
If a hacker compromises a system in which the owner has 
not taken reasonable care to secure and uses it to launch an 
attack against a third party, the owner of that system may 
be liable to the third party for negligence. Experts refer to 
this scenario as “downstream liability.” Although a case 
has yet to arise in the courts, honeypot operators may be 
especially vulnerable to downstream liability claims since it 
                                                     
68
 See, e.g., JEROME RADCLIFFE, CYBERLAW 101: A PRIMER ON US LAWS RELATED TO 
HONEYPOT DEPLOYMENTS 6-9 (2007), available at http://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/legal/cyberlaw-101-primer-laws-related-honeypot-deployments-1746. 
 
69
 See id. at 14-17. 
 
70
 See Schaufenbuel, supra note 34, at 16-17 (“Because a hacker finds a honeypot by 
actively searching the Internet for vulnerable hosts, and then attacks it without active 
encouragement by law enforcement officials, the defense of entrapment is not likely to be 
helpful to a hacker.”). 
 
71
 See Cole & Northcutt, supra note 67. 
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is highly foreseeable that such a system be misused in this 
manner.
72
 
 
Another honeypot risk is the unintended consequence of becoming a 
directed target because the honeypot provoked or attracted hackers to the 
company that deployed it, which hackers might otherwise have moved on 
to easier targets.  Another is that an improperly configured honeypot could 
ensnare an innocent third party or customer and collect legally-protected 
information (such as PII).  If that information is not handled according to 
applicable law, the owner of the honeypot could incur statutory liabilities 
therefor.
73
  And yet another scenario is one that, perhaps, only a lawyer 
would recognize as a risk: “[i]f you have a honeypot and do learn a lot 
from it but don’t remedy or correct it, then there’s a record that is 
discoverable and that you knew you had a problem and didn’t [timely] fix 
it.”74 
 
[16] Finally, there are uses for honeypots which, when regarded as a 
source of revenue by its owners, have the potential to cause substantial 
injury to brand image and reputation, and possibly court sanctions: one 
law firm has been accused of seeding the very copyrighted content it was 
retained to protect, which the firm used as evidence in copyright suits it 
prosecuted.
75
  Because of these alleged activities, the firm has been 
                                                     
72
 Schaufenbuel, supra note 34, at 19. 
 
73
 See generally id. (stating that the best way for a honeypot owner to avoid downstream 
liability is to configure the honeypot to prohibit or limit outbound connections to third 
parties).  
 
74
 Scott L. Vernick, To Catch a Hacker, Companies Start to Think Like One, FOX 
ROTHSCHILD, LLP (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.foxrothschild.com/print/convertToPDF.aspx?path=/newspubs/newspubsprint.
aspx&parms=id|15032388757.  
 
75
 See Kevin Parrish, Copyright Troll Busted for Seeding on The Pirate Bay, TOM’S 
GUIDE (Aug. 19, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/torrent-pirate-bay-
copyright-troll-prenda-law-honeypot,news-17391.html#torrent-pirate-bay-copyright-troll-
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labelled a “copyright troll.”76  The allegations, if proved true, also appear 
to involve acts of deception, discussed ante, which may subject the firm’s 
attorneys to attorney disciplinary proceedings.
77
  Further, the firm’s 
attorneys may incur other possible liabilities, such as vexatious and 
frivolous filing sanctions, abuse of process, barratry, or champerty.
78
 
 
E.  Retaliatory Hacking 
 
[17] A common belief for why corporations have little to fear in the 
way of prosecution for retaliatory hacking is, “criminals don’t call the 
cops.”79  Nevertheless, there is little debate that affirmative retaliatory 
hacking is unlawful,
80
 even if done in the interests of national security.
81
  
                                                                                                                                    
prenda-law-honeypot%2Cnews-
17391.html?&_suid=1396370990577022740795081848747. 
 
76
 Id. 
 
77
 See id. 
 
78
 See, e.g., Sean L. Harrington, Rule 11, Barratry, Champerty, and “Inline Links”, 
MINN. ST. BAR ASS’N COMPUTER & TECH. L. SEC. (Jan. 27, 2011, 11:42 PM), 
http://mntech.typepad.com/msba/2011/01/rule-11-barratry-champerty-and-inline-
links.html (discussing the vexatious litigation tactics of Righthaven, LLC). 
 
79
 See Scott Cohn, Companies Battle Cyberattacks Using ‘Hack Back’, CNBC (June 04, 
2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100788881 (“[L]aw enforcement is unlikely to 
detect or prosecute a hack back. ‘If the only organization that gets harmed is a number of 
criminals’ computers, I don't think it would be of great interest to law enforcement.”); 
Aarti Shahani, Tech Debate: Can Companies Hack Back?, AL JAZEERA AM. (Sept. 18, 
2013, 5:57 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/18/tech-debate-can-
companieshackback.html (“The Justice Department has not prosecuted any firm for 
hacking back and, as a matter of policy, will not say if any criminal investigations are 
pending”). 
 
80
 See Cohn, supra note 79 (statement of Professor Joel Reidenberg) (“‘Reverse hacking 
is a felony in the United States, just as the initial hacking was. It's sort of like, if someone 
steals your phone, it doesn't mean you're allowed to break into their house and take it 
back.’”); Shahani, supra note 79 (statement of David Wilson) (“‘No, it’s not legal, not 
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Although there may be “little debate,” there is debate.82  The views of 
many passionate information security analysts could be summed up by 
authors John Strand and Paul Asadoorian, who argue, “[c]urrently, our 
only defense tools are the same tools we have had for the past 10+ years, 
and they are failing.”83  David Willson, the owner and president of Titan 
Info Security Group, and a retired Army JAG, contends that using 
“automated tools outside of your own network to defend against attacks by 
innocent but compromised machines” is not gaining unauthorized access 
or a computer trespass, and he asks, “[i]f it is, how is it different from the 
adware, spam, cookies, or others that load on your machine without your 
knowledge, or at least with passive consent?”84  Willson provides a typical 
scenario and then examines the statutory language of the CFAA and offers 
some possible arguments—but notes his arguments bear stretch marks 
                                                                                                                                    
unless the blackmailer gave permission. . . . But who’s going to report it? Not the bad 
guy.’”). 
 
81
 See, e.g., Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (and the Man 
Who Tried to Stop Them), TIME (Sept. 5, 2005), 
http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/05au/readings/titan.rain.htm  
(discussing the “rogue” counter-hacking activities of Shawn Carpenter, who was working 
with the FBI and for whose activities Carpenter claimed the FBI considered prosecuting 
him). 
 
82
 See Dilanian, supra note 7 (“Others, including Stewart Baker, former NSA general 
counsel, said the law does allow hacking back in self-defense. A company that saw its 
stolen data on a foreign server was allowed to retrieve it, Baker argued.”) (In preparation 
for this comment, the author asked Mr. Baker about the interview, and he replied, “[T]he 
LA Times interview didn’t involve me talking about a particular case where retrieving 
data was legal.  I was arguing that it should be legal.”). 
 
83
 JOHN STRAND ET AL., OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES: THE ART OF ACTIVE DEFENSE 
207 (2013). 
 
84
 David Willson, Hacking Back in Self Defense: Is It Legal; Should It Be?, GLOBAL 
KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://blog.globalknowledge.com/technology/security/hacking-cybercrime/hacking-back-
in-self-defense-is-it-legal-should-it-be/.  
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(and he makes no offer of indemnification should practitioners decide to 
use them).
85
 
 
[18] Willson is not alone in searching for leeway within the CFAA.  
Stewart Baker, former NSA general counsel, argues on his blog,  
 
Does the CFAA, prohibit counterhacking? The use of the 
words “may be illegal,” and “should not” are a clue that the 
law is at best ambiguous. . . .  [V]iolations of the CFAA 
depend on “authorization.”  If you have authorization, it’s 
nearly impossible to violate the CFAA . . . [b]ut the CFAA 
doesn’t define “authorization.” . . . The more difficult 
question is whether you’re “authorized” to hack into the 
attacker’s machine to extract information about him and to 
trace your files. As far as I know, that question has never 
been litigated, and Congress’s silence on the meaning of 
“authorization” allows both sides to make very different 
arguments. . . . [C]omputer hackers won’t be bringing 
many lawsuits against their victims. The real question is 
whether victims can be criminally prosecuted for breaking 
into their attacker’s machine.86   
 
Other theories —and assorted arguments bearing stretch marks— 
analogize retaliatory hacking as subject to the recapture of chattels 
privilege,
87
 entry upon land to remove chattels,
88
 private necessity,
89
 or 
                                                     
85
 See id. 
 
86
 Stewart Baker, The Hack Back Debate (Nov. 02, 2012) 
http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/the-hackback-debate/.   
 
87
 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 22 (5th ed. 
1984). 
 
88
 See id. 
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even the castle doctrine.
90
  Jassandra K. Nanini, a cybersecurity law 
specialist, suggests applying the “security guard doctrine” as an analogy.91  
She posits that, if private actors act independently of law enforcement and 
have a valid purpose for their security activities that remains separate from 
law enforcement, then incidental use of evidence gained through those 
activities by law enforcement is permissible, even if the security guard 
acted unreasonably (as long as he remained within the confines of the 
purpose of his employer’s interests).92  As applied, Nanini explains the 
analogy as follows: 
 
If digital property were considered the same as physical, 
cyber security  guards could “patrol” client networks in 
search of intruder footprints, and based on sufficient 
evidence of a breach by a particular hacker, perhaps 
indicated by the user’s ISP, initiate a breach of the 
invader’s network in order to search for compromised data 
and disable its further use.  Even more aggressive attacks 
designed to plant malware in hacker networks could be 
considered seizure of an offensive weapon, comparable to a 
school security guard seizing a handgun from a malicious 
party.  Such proactive defense could use the hacker’s own 
malware to corrupt his systems when he attempts to 
retrieve the data from the company’s system.  Certainly all 
                                                                                                                                    
89
 See id. at § 24. 
 
90
 See id. at § 21. And see McGee, Sabett, & Shah, supra, note 18 (“Reaching consensus 
on applying the concepts of self-defense to the cyber domain has proven to be a difficult 
task, though not for the lack of trying”). 
 
91
 See Jassandra Nanini, China, Google, and Private Security: Can Hack-Backs Provide 
the Missing Defense in Cybersecurity, (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 14-15) (on file 
with author). 
 
92
 See id. (manuscript at 14).   
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of these activities are within the scope of the company’s 
valid interest, which include maintaining data integrity, 
preventing use of stolen data, and disabling further attack. . 
. .  Similarly, companies may wholly lack any consideration 
of collecting evidence for legal recourse, keeping in step 
with the private interest requirement of the private security 
guard doctrine in general.  All hack-backs could be 
executed without any  support or direction from law 
enforcement, opening the door to utilization  of evidence in 
a future prosecution against the hacker.
 93
 
 
The foregoing theories notwithstanding, what is clear is that obtaining 
evidence by use of a keylogger, spyware, or persistent cookies likely is 
violative of state and federal laws, such as the CFAA or ECPA.
94
  The 
CFAA, last amended in 2008, criminalizes anyone who commits, attempts 
to commit, or conspires to commit an offense under the Act, including 
offenses such as knowingly accessing without authorization a protected 
computer (for delineated purposes) or intentionally accessing a computer 
without authorization (for separately delineated purposes).
95
  Relevant 
statutory phrases, such as “without authorization” and “access,” have been 
the continuing subject of appellate review.
96
  One federal court, referring 
                                                     
93
 Id. (manuscript at 15-16).  
 
94
 See Sean Harrington, Why Divorce Lawyers Should Get Up to Speed on CyberCrime 
Law, MINN. ST. B. ASS’N COMPUTER & TECH. L. SEC. (Mar. 24, 2010, 9:40 PM), 
http://mntech.typepad.com/msba/2010/03/why-divorce-lawyers-should-get-up-to-speed-
on-cybercrime-law.html (collecting cases regarding unauthorized computer access). 
 
95
 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); see Clements-Jeffrey v. Springfield, 810 F. Supp. 2d 857, 
874 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“It is one thing to cause a stolen computer to report its IP address 
or its geographical location in an effort to track it down.  It is something entirely different 
to violate federal wiretapping laws by intercepting the electronic communications of the 
person using the stolen laptop.”). 
 
96
 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and 
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1624–42 (2003) 
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to both the ECPA and CFAA, pointed out that “the histories of these 
statutes reveal specific Congressional goals—punishing destructive 
hacking, preventing wiretapping for criminal or tortious purposes, 
securing the operations of electronic communication service providers—
that are carefully embodied in these criminal statutes and their 
corresponding civil rights of action.”97  At least one court has held that the 
use of persistent tracking cookies is a violation of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.
98
  Congress is currently considering reform 
to the CFAA, as well as comprehensive privacy legislation that would, in 
some circumstances, afford a private right of action to consumers whose 
personal information is collected without their consent.
 99
 
 
[19] Regardless of the frequency with which retaliatory hacking charges 
have been brought, one issue that has not yet been included in the debate 
involves illegally obtained evidence that is inadmissible.  This matters 
because bringing suit under the CFAA or ECPA is a remedy that corporate 
victims have recently invoked increasingly.
100
 
                                                                                                                                    
(showing how and why courts have construed unauthorized access statutes in an overly 
broad manner that threatens to criminalize a surprising range of innocuous conduct 
involving computers). 
 
97
 In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (emphasis 
added). 
 
98
 See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 13 & 21-22 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(holding use of tracking cookies to intercept electronic communications was within the 
meaning of the ECPA, because the acquisition occurred simultaneously with the 
communication). 
 
99
  See Peter J. Toren, Amending the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, BNA (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/amending-the-
computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/.  
 
100
 See, e.g., Holly R. Rogers & Katharine V. Hartman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act: A Weapon Against Employees Who Steal Trade Secrets, BNA (June 21, 2011) 
(“[E]mployers are increasingly using this cause of action to go after former employees 
who steal trade secrets from their company-issued computers.”). 
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[20] Another liability  —the one most frequently cited— is that of 
misattribution and collateral damage: 
 
[E]ncouraging digital vigilantes will only make the 
mayhem worse.  Hackers like to cover their tracks by 
routing attacks through other people’s computers, without 
the owners’ knowledge.  That raises the alarming prospect 
of collateral damage to an innocent bystander’s systems: 
imagine the possible consequences if the unwitting host of 
a battle between hackers and counter-hackers were a 
hospital’s computer.101 
 
Likewise, Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), sponsor for the Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) and Chair of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, warned private corporations 
against going on the offensive as part of their cyber security programs: 
“You don't want to attack the wrong place or disrupt the wrong place for 
somebody who didn't perpetrate a crime.”102 Contemplate the civil 
                                                     
101
 A Byte for a Byte, ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21583268/; see also Lewis, supra note 21 (“There is 
also considerable risk that amateur cyber warriors will lack the skills or the judgment to 
avoid collateral damage.  A careless attack could put more than the intended target at 
risk.  A nation has sovereign privileges in the use of force.  Companies do not.”); John 
Reed, The Cyber Security Recommendations of Blair and Huntsman's Report on Chinese 
IP Theft, COMPLEX FOREIGN POL’Y (May 22, 2012), 
http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/22/the_cyber_security_recomendations_
of_blair_and huntsman_report_on_chinese_ip_theft (“While it may be nice to punch back 
at a hacker and take down his or her networks or even computers, there's a big potential 
for collateral damage, especially if the hackers are using hijacked computers belonging to 
innocent bystanders.”). 
 
102
 John Reed, Mike Rogers: Cool It with Offensive Cyber Ops, COMPLEX FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Dec. 14, 2012, 5:07 PM), 
http:/complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/14/mike_rogers_cool_it_with_offensive_
cyber_ops (audio recording of full speech available at http://www.c-
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liabilities that one could incur if, in an effort to take down a botnet through 
self-help and vigilantism, the damaged computers belonged to customers, 
competitors, or competitors’ customers.  Aside from the financial losses 
and injury to brand reputation and goodwill, implicated financial 
institutions could expect increased regulatory scrutiny and could 
compromise government contracts subject to FISMA. 
 
[21] Yet another frequently discussed liability is that of escalation: 
cybercrime is perpetrated by many different attacker profiles of persons 
and entities, including cyber-terrorists, cyber-spies, cyber-thieves, cyber-
warriors, and cyber-hactivists.
103
  Because the purported motivation of a 
cyber-hactivist is principle, retaliation by the corporate victim may be 
received as an invitation to return fire and escalate.  Similarly, 
“[e]ncouraging corporations to compete with the Russian mafia or Chinese 
military hackers to see who can go further in violating the law . . . is not a 
contest American companies can win.”104  Conversely, the motivation of a 
cyber-thief is principal and interest, so retaliation by the target might be 
taken as a suggestion to move on to an easier target.  Because the 
perpetrators are usually anonymous, the corporate victim has no way to 
make a risk-based and proportional response premised upon the 
classification of the attacker as nation-state, thief, or hactivist. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
span.org/video?314114-1/rep-rogers-rmi-addresses-cyber-threats-economy). But see See 
McGee, Sabett, & Shah, supra, note 18 (urging the adoption of a “Framework for ‘good 
enough’ attribution”). 
 
103
 For definitions and discussion of these terms, see ERIC A. FISCHER ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42984, THE 2013 CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER: OVERVIEW 
AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 2-4, (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42984.pdf.  
 
104
 Max Fisher, Should the U.S. Allow Companies to ‘Hack Back’ Against Foreign Cyber 
Spies?, WASH. POST (May 23, 2013, 10:43 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/23/should-the-u-s-allow-
companies-to-hack-back-against-foreign-cyber-spies/ (quoting Lewis, supra, note 21). 
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[I]n cyberspace attribution is a little harder.  On the 
playground you can see the person who hit you . . . well, 
almost always[,]  . . . in cyberspace we can track IP 
addresses and TTPs from specific threat actors, which 
smart analysts and researchers tell us is a viable way to 
perform attribution.  I agree with them, largely, but there’s 
a fault there.  An IP address belonging to China SQL 
injecting your enterprise applications is hardly a smoking 
gun that Chinese APTs are after you.  Attackers have been 
using others’ modus operandi to mask their identities for as 
long as spy games have been played.  Attackers have been 
known to use compromised machines and proxies in hostile 
countries for as long as I can remember caring—to “bounce 
through” to attack you.  Heck, many of the attacks that 
appear to be originating from nation-states that we suspect 
are hacking us may very well be coming from a hacker at 
the coffee house next door to your office, using multiple 
proxies to mask their true origin.  This is just good OpSec, 
and attackers use this method all the time, let’s not kid 
ourselves.
105
 
 
If, without conclusive attribution and intelligence, the corporate victim is 
unable to make a risk-based and proportional response, it may be 
reasonable to question whether retaliatory hacking is abandoning the risk-
based approach to business problems exhorted by FFIEC,
106
 PCI,
107 
and 
                                                     
105
 Los, supra note 19. 
 
106
 See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Layered Security Essential Tactic of Latest FFIEC Banking 
Guidelines, EWEEK (June 30, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/IT-
Infrastructure/Layered-Security-Essential-Tactic-of-Latest-FFIEC-Banking-Guidelines-
557743/ (“Banks must adopt a layered approach to security in order to combat highly 
sophisticated cyber-attacks, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council said 
in a supplement released June 28. The new rules update the 2005 ‘Authentication in an 
Internet Banking Environment’ guidance to reflect new security measures banks need to 
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the NIST Cybersecurity Framework?
108
  “If we start using those sort of 
[cyber weapons], it doesn't take much to turn them against us, and we are 
tremendously vulnerable,” said Howard Schmidt, a former White House 
cyber security coordinator.
109
 
 
[22] Then there is the often overlooked issue of professional ethics—
not for the attorney—but for the information security professional.  
“Ethics,” a term derived from the ancient Greek ethikos (ἠθικός), has been 
defined as “a custom or usage.”110  Modernly, ethics is understood to be 
“[professional] norms shared by a group on a basis of mutual and usually 
reciprocal recognition.”111  The codes of ethics provide articulable 
principles against which one’s decision-making is objectively measured, 
and serve other important interests, including presenting an image of 
                                                                                                                                    
fend off increasingly sophisticated attacks. . . . The guidance . . . emphasized a risk-based 
approach in which controls are strengthened as risks increase.”). 
 
107
 See PCI 2.0 Encourages Risk-Based Process: Three Things You Need to Know, 
ITGRC (Aug. 23, 2010), http://itgrcblog.com/2010/08/23/pci-2-0-encourages-risk-based-
process-three-things-you-need-to-know/. 
 
108
 See Lee Vorthman, IT Security: NIST's Cybersecurity Framework, NETAPP (July 16, 
2013, 6:01 AM), https://communities.netapp.com/community/netapp-blogs/government-
gurus/blog/2013/07/16/it-security-nists-cybersecurity-framework) (“It is widely 
anticipated that the Cybersecurity Framework will improve upon the current 
shortcomings of FISMA by adopting several controls for continuous monitoring and by 
allowing agencies to move away from compliance-based assessments towards a real-time 
risk-based approach.”).  
 
109
 Reed, supra note 102. 
 
110
 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 447, 453 (1995), 
available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/252. 
 
111
 Id. 
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prestige and credibility for the organization and the profession,
112
 
eliminating unfair competition,
113
 and fostering cooperation among 
professionals.
114
 
 
[23] Many information security professionals are certified by the 
International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium 
((ISC)
2®
).  The (ISC)
2® 
 Committee has recognized its responsibility to 
provide guidance for “resolving good versus good, and bad versus bad, 
dilemmas,” and “to encourage right behavior.”115  The Committee also has 
the responsibility to discourage certain behaviors, such as raising 
unnecessary alarm, fear, uncertainty, or doubt; giving unwarranted 
                                                     
112
 See generally HEINZ C. LUEGENBIEHL & MICHAEL DAVIS, ENGINEERING CODES OF 
ETHICS: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS 10 (1986) (referring to the “Contract with society” 
theory on the relation between professions and codes of ethics). 
 
According to this approach, a code of ethics is one of those things a 
group must have before society will recognize it as a profession.  The 
contents of the code are settled by considering what society would 
accept in exchange for such benefits of professionalism as high income 
and high prestige.  A code is a way to win the advantages society grants 
only to those imposing certain restraints on themselves. 
 
Id. 
 
113
 See, e.g., OFFICIAL (ISC)
2
 GUIDE TO THE CISSP CBK 1214 (Steven Hernandez ed., 3d 
ed. 2013) (“The code helps to protect professionals from certain stresses and pressures 
(such as the pressure to cut corners with information security to save money) by making 
it reasonably likely that most other members of the profession will not take advantage of 
the resulting conduct of such pressures.  An ethics code also protects members of a 
profession from certain consequences of competition, and encourages cooperation and 
support among the professionals.”). 
 
114
 See id. 
 
115
 (ISC)
2
, (ISC)
2
 OVERVIEW: EVOLVING IN TODAY’S COMPLEX SECURITY LANDSCAPE 4 
(2013), available at 
www.infosec.co.uk/_novadocuments/47180?v=635294483175930000. 
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comfort or reassurance; consenting to bad practice; attaching weak 
systems to the public network; professional association with non-
professionals; professional recognition of, or association with, amateurs; 
or associating or appearing to associate with criminals or criminal 
behavior.
116
  Therefore, an information security professional bound by this 
code who undertakes active defense activities that he or she knows or 
should know are unlawful, or proceeds where the legality of such behavior 
not clear, may be in violation the Code. 
 
[24] It would stand to reason that, an organization that empowers, 
directs, or acquiesces to conduct by its employees that violates the (ISC)
 
Code of Ethics may violate its own corporate ethics or otherwise 
compromise its ethical standing in the corporate community—or not: 
when Google launched a “secret counter-offensive” and “managed to gain 
access to a computer in Taiwan that it suspected of being the source of the 
attacks,”117 tech sources praised Google’s bold action.118 
 
[25] Nevertheless, corporate ethics is an indispensable consideration in 
the hack back debate.  The code of ethics and business conduct for 
financial institutions should reflect and reinforce corporate values, 
including uncompromising integrity, respect, responsibility and good 
citizenship.  As noted above, retaliatory hacking is deceptive and has been 
characterized as reckless, and even Web bugs are commonly associated 
with spammers.  Corporate management must consider whether resorting 
to techniques pioneered by and associated with criminals or spammers has 
                                                     
116
 See id. 
 
117
  David E. Sanger & John Markoff, After Google’s Stand on China, U.S. Treads 
Lightly, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/world/asia/15diplo.html?_r=0. 
 
118
 See, e.g., Skipper Eye, Google Gives Chinese Hackers a Tit for Tat, REDMOND PIE 
(Jan. 16, 2010), available at http://www.redmondpie.com/google-gives-chinese-hackers-
a-tit-for-tat-9140352/. 
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the potential to compromise brand image in the eyes of existing and 
prospective customers.  Similarly, to the extent that financial corporations 
are engaging in active defense covertly,
119
 corporate management must 
consider whether customers’ confidence in the security of their data and 
investments could be shaken when such activities are uncovered.  Will 
customers wonder whether their data has been placed at risk because of 
escalation?  Will shareholders question whether such practices are within 
the scope of good corporate stewardship? 
 
III.  ALTERNATIVES TO RETALIATORY HACKING 
 
[26] The obvious argument in support of active defense is that the law 
and governments are doing little to protect private corporations and 
persons from cybercrime, which has inexorably resulted in resort to self-
help,
120
 and those who vociferously counsel to refrain from active defense 
often have little advice on alternatives.  At the risk of pointing out the 
obvious, one counsels, “‘when you look at active defense, we need to 
focus on reducing our vulnerabilities.’”121 
 
[27] Alternatives to hacking back are evolving, and one of the more 
promising is the pioneering threat intelligence gathering and sharing from 
the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (“FS-
                                                     
119
 See Shelley Boose, Black Hat Survey: 36% of Information Security Professionals 
Have Engaged in Retaliatory Hacking, BUSINESSWIRE (June 26, 2012, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120726006045/en/Black-Hat-Survey-36-
Information-Security-Professionals (“When asked ‘Have you ever engaged in retaliatory 
hacking?’ 64% said ‘never,’ 23% said ‘once,’ and 13% said ‘frequently”. . . . [W]e 
should take these survey results with a grain of salt . . . . It’s safe to assume some 
respondents don’t want to admit they use retaliatory tactics.”).   
 
120
 Lewis, supra note 21 (“Another argument is that governments are not taking action, 
and therefore private actors must step in.”). 
 
121
 Reed, supra note 102. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 4 
 
 
34 
 
ISAC”), which collects information about threats and vulnerabilities from 
its 4,400 FI members, government partners, and special relationships with 
Microsoft
®
, iSIGHT Partners
SM
, Secunia, et al., anonymizes the data, and 
distributes it back to members.
122
  In addition to e-mail alerts and a Web 
portal, FS-ISAC holds regular tele-conferences during which vulnerability 
and threat information is discussed, and during which presentations on 
current topics are given.
123
  The FS-ISAC recently launched a security 
automation project to eliminate manual processes to collect and distribute 
cyber threat information, according to Bill Nelson, the Center’s director.124  
The objective of the project is to significantly reduce operating costs and 
lower fraud losses for financial institutions, by consuming threat 
information on a real-time basis.
125
 
 
[28] Although, as American Banker wryly observes, “[b]ankers have 
never been too keen on sharing secrets with one another,” 126 dire 
                                                     
122
 See About FS-ISAC, FIN. SERV.: INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CENTER, 
https://www.fsisac.com/about (last visited June 9, 2014). Launched in 1999, FS-ISAC 
was established by the financial services sector in response to 1998's Presidential 
Directive 63.  That directive ― later updated by 2003's Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 7 ― mandated that the public and private sectors share information about 
physical and cyber security threats and vulnerabilities to help protect the U.S. critical 
infrastructure.  See id.  
 
123
 See id. 
 
124
 FS-ISAC Security Automation Working Group Continues to Mature Automated Threat 
Intelligence Strategy, Deliver on Multi-Year Roadmap, FIN. SERV.: INFO. SHARING & 
ANALYSIS CENTER (Feb. 26, 2014), 
https://www.fsisac.com/sites/default/files/news/FSISAC_PR_SAWG_Feb19-
2014v1AH%20-%20DHE-ALL-EDITS-FINAL2%20EG.pdf. 
 
125
 See id. 
 
126
 Sean Sposito, In Cyber Security Fight, Collaboration Is Key: Guardian Analytics, AM. 
BANKER (Oct. 08. 2013, 2:01 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_195/in-
cyber-security-fight-collaboration-is-key-guardian-analytics-1062688-1.html. 
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circumstances have catalyzed a new era of cooperation, paving the way for 
the success of the cooperative model developed by the FS-ISAC—even 
before its current ambitious automation project, which has resulted in 
successful botnet takedown operations.
127
  An illustrative example is the 
Citadel malware botnet takedown, where Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit, 
in collaboration with the FS-ISAC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
the American Bankers Association, NACHA—The Electronic Payments 
Association, and others, executed a simultaneous operation to disrupt 
more than 1,400 Citadel botnets reportedly responsible for over half a 
billion dollars in losses worldwide.
128
  With the assistance of U.S. 
Marshals, data and evidence, including servers, were seized from data 
hosting facilities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and was made possible 
by a court ordered civil seizure warrant from a U.S. federal court.
129
  
Microsoft also reported that it shared information about the botnets’ 
operations with international Computer Emergency Response Teams, 
which can deal with elements of the botnets outside U.S. jurisdiction, and 
the FBI informed enforcement agencies in those countries.
130
  Similar, 
more recent, operations include one characterized as “major takedown of 
the Shylock Trojan botnet,” which botnet is described as “an advanced 
cybercriminal infrastructure attacking online banking systems around the 
world,” that reportedly was coordinated by the UK National Crime 
Agency (NCA), and included Europol, the FBI, BAE Systems Applied 
                                                     
127
 See generally, Taking Down Botnets: Public and Private Efforts to Disrupt and 
Dismantle Cybercriminal Networks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong.  (July 15, 2014) http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/taking-down-
botnets_public-and-private-efforts-to-disrupt-and-dismantle-cybercriminal-networks 
(providing access to testimony from the hearing).  
 
128
 See Tracy Kitten, Microsoft, FBI Take Down Citadel Botnets, BANK INFO SECURITY 
(June 6, 2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/microsoft-fbi-takedown-citadel-
botnets-a-5819/op-1. 
 
129
 See id. 
 
130
 See id.  
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Intelligence, Dell SecureWorks, Kaspersky Lab and the UK's GCHQ,
131
 
and another takedown operation that targeted the much-feared 
Cryptolocker.
132
   Following the FS-ISAC model, the retail sector has 
taken the “historic decision” to share data on cyber-threats for the first 
time through a newly-formed Retail Cyber Intelligence Sharing Center (R-
CISC),
133
 and the financial services and retail sectors formed a cross-
partnership.
134
  
 
[29] Finally, at the time of this publication, a draft Cybersecurity 
Information-Sharing Act of 2014, advanced by Chairman Dianne 
Feinstein (D-CA) and ranking member Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), was 
passed out of the Senate Intelligence on a 12-3 vote, and is expected to be 
put to a vote in the full Senate.
135
  The bill is designed to enhance and 
                                                     
131
 See NCA Leads Global Shylock Malware Takedown, INFOSECURITY (July 12, 2014) 
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/39289/nca-leads-global-shylock-malware-
takedown/. 
 
132
 See Gregg Keizer, Massive Botnet Takedown Stops Spread of Cryptolocker 
Ransomware, COMPUTERWORLD (June 5, 2014 02:15 PM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9248872/Massive_botnet_takedown_stops_spre
ad_of_Cryptolocker_ransomware. 
 
133
 John E. Dunn, Worried US Retailers Battle Cyber-attacks Through New Intelligence-
Sharing Body, TECHWORLD (May 16, 2014, 6:29 PM),  
http://news.techworld.com/security/3517094/worried-us-retailers-battle-cyber-attacks-
through-new-inte/. 
 
134
 See, e.g., Dan Dupont Retail, Financial Sectors Form Cybersecurity Partnership in 
Wake of Data Breaches (March 13, 2014), http://insidecybersecurity.com/Cyber-Daily-
News/Daily-News/retail-financial-sectors-form-cybersecurity-partnership-in-wake-of-
data-breaches/menu-id-1075.html.  
 
135
 See Press Release, Dianne Feinstein, Senate Intelligence Committee Approves Cyber 
Security Bill (July 8, 2014) available at 
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/7/senate-intelligence-committee-
approves-cybersecurity-bill.  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 4 
 
 
37 
 
provide liability protections for information sharing between private 
corporate entities, between private corporate entities and the Government, 
and between Government agencies. 
 
[30] Yet another promising option is the partnership that critical 
infrastructure institutions have formed, or should investigate forming, with 
ISPs.  For example, ISPs currently provide DDoS mitigation services that, 
although not particularly effective in application vulnerability (OSI model 
layer 7) attacks, are very capable in responding to volume-based 
attacks.
136
  One senior ISP executive proposed to this author, under the 
Chatham House Rule,
137
 the possibility that ISPs may be able to provide 
aggregated threat intelligence information, including attribution, based 
upon monitoring of the entirety of its networks (not merely the network 
traffic to and from an individual corporate client).  
 
[31] ISPs’ capabilities are, however, subject both to statutory and 
regulatory limitations, including, for example, the Cable Act,
138
 and 
                                                     
136
 See BRENT ROWE ET AL., THE ROLE OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS IN CYBER 
SECURITY 7 (2011), available at http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/ISP-
Provided_Security-Research-Brief_Rowe.pdf. 
 
137
 See, generally, Chatham House Rule, CHATHAM HOUSE; THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS http://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule 
(explaining the Chatham House Rule).  
 
138
 Section 631 of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521, et 
seq.  The Cable Act prohibits cable systems’ disclosure of personally identifiable 
subscriber information without the subscriber’s prior consent; requires the operator to 
destroy information that is no longer necessary for the purpose it was collected, to notify 
subscribers of system data collection, retention and disclosure practices and to afford 
subscribers access to information pertaining to them; provides certain exceptions to the 
disclosure restrictions, such as permission for the cable operator to disclose “if necessary 
to conduct a legitimate business activity related to a cable service or other service” 
provided to the subscriber, and disclosure of subscriber names and addresses (but not 
phone numbers), subject to an “opt out” right for the subscriber. Congress expanded, as 
part of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, the 
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proposed rules that would restrict the blocking of “lawful content, 
applications, services, or non-harmful devices,” that may appear to 
implicate liability-incurring discretion.
139
 
 
[32] Nevertheless, several researchers urge that ISPs should assume a 
“larger security role,” and are in a good position “to cost-effectively 
prevent certain types of malicious cyber behavior, such as the operation of 
botnets on home users’ and small businesses’ computers.”140   Likewise, 
the Federal Communications Commission has defined “legitimate network 
management” as including “ensuring network security and integrity” and 
managing traffic unwanted by end users: 
 
In the context of broadband Internet access services, 
techniques to ensure network security and integrity are 
designed to protect the access network and the Internet 
against actions by malicious or compromised end systems.  
Examples include spam, botnets, and distributed denial of 
service attacks.  Unwanted traffic includes worms, 
malware, and virus that exploit end-user system 
vulnerabilities; denial of service attacks; and spam.
141
 
 
N.B., a 2010 study found that just ten ISPs accounted for 30 percent of IP 
addresses sending out spam worldwide.
142
  And, in 2011, it was reported 
                                                                                                                                    
privacy provision of the Communications Act to cover interactive services provided by 
cable operators.  Id.  
 
139
 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, at App’x A, §§ 
8.5, 8.11 (May 15, 2015).  
 
140
 Id. at 1-2. 
 
141
 Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. 59192, 59209 n.102 (Sept. 23, 2011). 
 
142
 MICHEL VAN EETEN ET AL., THE ROLE OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS IN BOTNET 
MITIGATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON SPAM DATA 1 (2010), available at 
http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/papers/session4/weis2010_vaneeten.pdf. 
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that over 80% of infected machines were located within networks of ISPs, 
and that fifty ISPs control about 50% of all botnet infected machines 
worldwide.
143
 
 
[33] Other options that some companies have pursued as alternatives to 
the pitfalls of inherently risky threat counter-intelligence gathering 
discussed above include risk transfer or automated monitoring, both of 
which rely on outside vendors or subscription services. 
 
[34] Under the risk transfer approach, a corporate entity may choose to 
rely on the findings of a private contractor or company without undue 
concern for how the contractor or firm acquired the information. U.S. 
companies already outsource threat intelligence gathering to firms who 
employ operatives in Israel, such as IBM-Trusteer and RSA,
144
 ostensibly 
because these operatives are able to effectively obtain information without 
running afoul of U.S. law. For legal scholars, perhaps a case to help justify 
this approach might be that of the famous Pentagon Papers (New York 
Times v. United States), in which the Supreme Court held that the public’s 
right to know was superior to the Government’s need to maintain secrecy 
of the information, notwithstanding that the leaked documents were 
obtained unlawfully (i.e., in alleged violation of § 793 of the Espionage 
Act).
145
  Yet, a corporate entity that knowingly—or with blissful 
ignorance—retains the services resulting from unethical conduct or 
conduct that would be criminal if undertaken in the U.S. may nevertheless 
suffer injury to the brand resulting from revelations of the vendor’s 
actions.   
 
                                                     
143
 Rowe et al., supra note 136. 
 
144
 See, e.g., Meir Orbach, Israeli Cyber Tech Companies on Rise in US Market, AL 
MONITOR (Jan. 23, 2014) http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2014/01/us-cyber-
security-market-israeli-companies.html.   
 
145
 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
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[35] Under the automated monitoring approach, corporate entities rely 
on vendor subscription services, such as Internet Identity (IID™), that use 
automated software to monitor various fora or social media sites for the 
occurrence of keywords, concepts, or sentiment, and then alert the 
customer.  Variations of these technologies are in use for high frequency 
stock trading and e-Discovery.  An example might be detecting the 
offering for sale on a site of primary account numbers and related 
information by a cyberthief, and providing real-time notification to the 
merchant so that the accounts can be disabled. 
 
[36] Other promising options include “big data” approach, which is to 
employ data scientists and software and hardware automation in-house to 
draw more meaningful inferences from the data and evidence already 
legally within the company’s custody and control.  For example, David 
Bianco, a “network hunter” for security firm FireEye, suggests allocating 
resources for detecting, evaluating, and treating threat indicators according 
to their value to the attacker, which he represents in his so-called 
“Pyramid of Pain.”146  Under this model, remediation efforts are directed 
toward those indicators that are costly (in time or resources) to the 
attacker, requiring the attacker to change strategy or incur more costs.
147
  
Bianco proposed this model after concluding that organizations seem to 
blindly collect and aggregate indicators, without making the best use of 
them.
148
  Vendors, such as Guardian Analytics,
149
 FireEye’s Threat 
Analytics Program,
150
 CrowdStrike’s Falcon platform,151 and HP’s 
                                                     
146
 See David Bianco, The Pyramid of Pain, ENTERPRISE DETECTION & RESPONSE BLOG 
(Mar. 1, 2014), http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/#!/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html. 
 
147
 See id.   
 
148
 See id.  
 
149
 See Sposito, supra note 126. 
 
150
 See FireEye Threat Analytics Platform, FIREEYE, http://www.fireeye.com/products-
and-solutions/threat-analytics-platform.htm (last visited June 9, 2014). 
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Autonomy IDOL
152
 (intelligent data operating layer) are endeavoring to 
bring real-time threat intelligence parsing or information sharing tools and 
services to the marketplace. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
[37] Hack back or active defense, depending on how one defines 
each—and everything in between—consists of activities that are both 
lawful and unlawful, and which carry all the business and professional 
risks associated with deceptive practices, misattribution, and escalation.  
To urge a risk-based approach to using even lawful active defense tactics 
would be to state the obvious, and the use of certain types of active 
defense where misattribution is possible, may be to entirely abandon the 
risk-based approach to problem solving.  Moreover, at the time of this 
writing, a qualified privilege to hack back through legislative reform 
seems unlikely, and would be difficult because the holder of such a 
privilege would not only have to establish proper intent, but also 
attribution.  However, the tools, technologies, partnerships, and 
information sharing between corporations, governments, vendors, and 
trade associations are promising; they have already proven effective, and 
are steadily improving.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
151
 See Tim Wilson, CrowdStrike Turns Security Fight Toward Attacker, DARK READING 
(June 25, 2013, 9:18 AM), http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/threat-
intelligence/crowdstrike-turns-security-fight-toward-attacker/d/d-id/1139998?.  
 
152
 See HP IDOL, HP AUTONOMY, www.autonomy.com/products/idol (last visited June 9, 
2014). 
